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a b s t r a c t
Assuming a broad set of fisheries management goals, this paper analyzes the implementation of a
marine protected area (MPA) together with open access outside, applying a bioeconomic model that
ensures unchanged growth post-MPA. Taking into account that conservation and restoration, food
security, employment and social surplus are amongst the objectives that many managers include in
fisheries management, it is found that this broader welfare economic approach to MPAs may well
recommend them to a greater degree than espoused in the more common resource rent focused studies
carried out to date. It is shown that for overfished stocks, an MPA may yield resource protection,
maximize harvests and increase consumer and producer surplus, as well as give higher employment.
This, however, is less apparent for moderately overfished as well as highly migratory stocks. Resource
protection and enhancement implicitly improves ecosystem services.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
In the fisheries and development economics literature there is
currently a debate over the right approach to fisheries management
in developing countries. On the one side is found what is often
referred to as the wealth-based approach [1,2], taking the standard
microeconomic approach stating that effort has to be restricted in
order for a fishery to generate rent, which then can be used to
improve livelihood conditions. On the other side is found what has
been referred to as the welfare approach [3–6], claiming that for
very poor countries, the benefits from open access fisheries in terms
of food security, as an income source and as a labor market buffer
may outweigh the benefits of generating resource rent by restrict-
ing access. It is not the latter group's claim that the access to
fisheries in developing countries should remain unrestricted for-
ever, but that care should be taken in the transition. Béné et al. [4]
state that the reduction of fishing capacity should be driven by pull
factors such as growth in the remaining economy, rather than push
factors such as exclusion by laws and regulation, and uses Norway
as an example of a case where this has successfully occurred.
Wilson and Boncoeur [5] point to the fact, demonstrated in several
papers, that there is a correlation between countries with rich
resource endowments and poor governance, a situation often
referred to as the resource curse. They use a macroeconomic model
to show that if mechanisms for redistribution of accrued resource
rent are lacking and if the government has a higher tendency to
spend money on unproductive import goods than the rest of the
population, the efficient solution will deviate in the direction
of higher fishing effort than what is found when using a partial
equilibrium model to analyze the fishing sector alone.
The following expands upon the literature mentioned above and
argues that marine protected areas (MPAs) in combination with
open access outside in the harvest zone (HZ), may be coherent with
the welfare approach: they may, given some fundamental biological
and economic characteristics, ensure maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) and provide protection of resources. Hence they function as a
policy instrument contributing to food safety and employment,
while at the same time providing economic benefits in terms of
increased consumer and producer surplus, as well as contributing
to protection of the biotic and non-biotic marine environment. On
the cautionary side, this paper argues that the use of MPAs may
complicate the path towards other types of regulations that could
generate resource rent. This due to the fact that the introduction of
an MPA may increase the equilibrium effort level in the fishery as
compared to the purely open access case.
MPAs have been much addressed in the fisheries literature and
they have, generally, been embraced by biologists as a potent tool
in fisheries management and conservation (see e.g. [7,8]), while
receiving a fair amount of skepticism from economists (see e.g. [9–11]).
Biologists have claimed that economists fail to take the complexity of
the ecosystems into account in their analysis, thereby underestimating
the potential benefits from creating MPAs, while economists accuse
biologists of applying too simplistic models of human behavior (see
e.g. [12,13]) and as a result overestimating the benefits.
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Some of the skepticism expressed towards MPAs may have
been based on the choice of growth model and management
objective. Flaaten and Mjølhus [14,15] showed that the type of
model used by e.g. Hannesson [9] and Sanchirico and Wilen [16]
implies that post-MPA growth will be lower than pre-MPA growth,
independent of any harvest. With this property built into the
models used to evaluate the effect of an MPA, it should come as no
surprise that a reserve is found to be costly in terms of fisheries.
Though some studies have paid attention to harvest and conserva-
tion goals [10], most economic analysis of MPAs has focused on
simple single-stock models without taking into account broader
ecosystem or conservation values (see [17–20] for some excep-
tions). It should be admitted that conservation may be a goal in
itself, meriting the study of target stock levels, as well as habitat
restoration.
Within fisheries economics, analyzing management strategies
to maximize resource rent is a central issue, but consumer and
producer surplus (CS and PS respectively), the importance of
which was illustrated in Copes' [21] seminal article, are also
central elements of total economic surplus. Conditions under
which an MPA can contribute to a change in PS and CS are
suggested in Pezzey et al. [22] and mentioned in Sanchirico and
Wilen [10], but are not included in their modeling. Hence,
although economists often compare private property regimes or
pure open access to MPAs in combination with open access
[9,16,23], hardly any effort has been made to analyze when CS
and PS will be generated and to what extent. This paper revisits
the issue of the economics of marine protected areas using a
model that does not assume lower biological growth through the
introduction of a reserve, and extends the literature by focusing on
other welfare economic benefits than solely resource rent.
The article is structured as follows: in Section 2 the model used
for the analysis is presented. Section 3 isolates the conditions
under which an MPA can be beneficial in terms of stock protection,
harvest, employment, as well as consumer and producer surplus.
Section 4 provides discussion, while Section 5 presents concluding
remarks and policy recommendations.
2. The model
The model used is developed by Flaaten and Mjølhus [14,15],
based on the logistic growth model. This section presents the parts
necessary for the current analysis. Important characteristics of this
model are that it ensures the same growth and yield potential pre-
and post-MPA (denoted model A in Flaaten and Mjølhus [14,15]).
2.1. Pre-MPA dynamics and yield
The pre-MPA population is assumed to grow logistically and
growth is given by
_S¼ rSð1SÞY ; ð1Þ
where S is population size normalized by setting the carrying
capacity equal to unity. Patchiness and ecosystem issues are
disregarded and the habitat of the resource is a homogenous area,
also equal to unity. The intrinsic growth rate is r and Y is the
harvest, assuming that harvest can be described by the Schaefer
catch function, Y¼rES, where E is fishing effort, scaled such that
the catchability coefficient equals the intrinsic growth rate.1 This
harvest function will be used later (see the last expression in
Eq. (3)), but using stock density in the fishing zone rather than the
total stock density. Pre-MPA S represents both the population size
and density in a population distribution area of unit size. With the
introduction of a reserve and a harvest area below, the population
density in the harvest zone enters the harvest function instead of
the total population.
2.2. Post-MPA population dynamics and yield
The carrying capacity as well as the habitat area is, as noted
above, equal to unity in this modeling approach. When an MPA is
established it means that a fraction of the carrying capacity and
the habitat is set aside for protection from fishing and other
activities that could harm natural growth. This fraction is denoted
m and is the size of the MPA relative to the habitat area.
Introduction of an MPA of size m, a harvest zone (HZ) of size
1m and assuming density dependent migration between the
two areas alters the dynamics to

















S1 denotes population in area 1, the MPA, S2 the population in area
2, the HZ, E fishing effort and γ¼s/r, where s 40 is the migration
coefficient. Thus γ, the relative migration rate is the ratio of the
migration coefficient to the intrinsic growth rate. Note that the
population density in the HZ, and not the total population density,
now enters the harvest function as shown in the last term in
Eq. (3).
The sustainable yield in the case of an MPA is
YðS1; S2Þ ¼ rðS1þS2Þð1ðS1þS2ÞÞ: ð4Þ
Thus sustainable yield is determined by the total stock, benefiting
from the spillover to the harvest zone from the MPA.
2.3. Economic model
Unit price of harvest and cost of effort is assumed2 to be
constant and the profit can thus be described by
π ¼ pY–C; ð5Þ
where p is the price per unit harvest and C is the total cost. Two
different price and cost functions are used. First, to keep it simple a
constant price of fish and a linear cost function with C¼aE are
used throughout most of the analysis, where a is the unit cost of
effort, including the opportunity cost of labor and capital as well as
normal remuneration of owner capital. Second, to address the
issue of consumer surplus, a downward sloping demand is
required and the form used is price¼pβY in Section 3.4. For the
discussion of producer surplus in Section 3.5, a convex cost function
is required, and the form chosen is the quadratic C¼αE2, knowing
that any form could do as long as the marginal cost increases with
effort. Thus any C¼αEa, with a41, may be used. Possible implica-
tions of this for the results are discussed in Section 3.5.





where μ is the effort response parameter, AR(E) is the average
1 Biologists often use the harvest function Y¼FX, with F as the instantaneous
fishing mortality. In bioeconomic models in this and many other papers the
product qE¼rE corresponds to F. The choice of scale for E is just a matter of
convenience and in this analysis a catchability coefficient equal to r makes some of
the equations and expressions simpler. 2 These assumptions are relaxed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
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revenue as a function of effort and MC(E) is the marginal cost of
effort. Equilibrium under pure open access requires that (1) and
(6) both equal zero, while for an MPA and open access equilibrium
in HZ it is required that (2), (3) and (6) all equal zero. In the pre-
reserve case when both price p and unit cost of effort a are
constant, equilibrium stock level and fish density will be S¼c¼a/
pr and equilibrium effort will be E¼1c. In the case of an MPA and
open access HZ the stock level in the harvest zone will be S2¼c
(1m). Note that the fish density at open-access equilibrium is the
same pre-reserve and post-reserve. The steady state stock levels in
the case of a downward sloping demand or non-linear costs will
be addressed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
2.4. Parameter values
Parameter values used for figures and illustrations are listed in
Table 1. The analysis is restricted to fisheries where the stock is
biologically overfished, implying that the pre-MPA stock level is
less than 50% of the carrying capacity. Two cases are chosen, one in
which the stock is severely overfished and at only 15% of the
carrying capacity, and one in which the stock is lightly overfished,
with equilibrium stock level at 45% of carrying capacity.3 The
analysis is restricted to cases where an MPA will be sufficient to
protect a stock from extinction even in the case of zero cost
harvesting – when γ, the ratio of the migration coefficient and the
intrinsic growth rate of the stock is less than 1. If γ41, an MPA
alone will not be sufficient to protect a stock from extinction in the
zero cost case ([15], Theorem 1). As the value of this parameter is
significant for the results, two different values are used; γ¼0.3 and
γ¼0.7, recalling that γ¼s/r.
3. What can be achieved with an MPA?
3.1. Conservation and restoration
Conservation of fish stocks may be an objective in itself, for
example to reduce the risk of extinction or to ensure non-use and/
or option values of the resource. Non-use values incorporate
existence and bequest values, such as the pure valuation of the
existence of natural resources or the willingness to pay to leave
resources for future generations. Option values are the willingness
to pay to ensure possible future values of the resources.
For use value the pertinent question is what difference can an
MPA make if there are open-access fisheries outside the reserve?
This question can be addressed from two angles. First, what limit
to effort is necessary to assure a given minimum level of the fish
stock? Taking this approach E can be treated as an exogenous
variable. Second, how does equilibrium fishing effort change as a
consequence of an MPA? This question requires treating E as an
endogenous variable. The former question will be discussed in this
section and the latter will be addressed in Section 3.5.
To keep the stock above a precautionary level, say ε, there is an
upper effort level denoted the precautionary effort level, Eε, which
cannot be exceeded on a permanent basis. Under pure open access
the precautionary effort level will be Eε¼1ε. This precautionary
effort level in the MPA case can be found by using (2) and (3) (see
[14] for more details):
Eε ¼ 1εþ mð1εÞγ=mð1εÞ1: ð7Þ
Thus Eε depends on the precautionary stock level ε, the intrinsic
growth rate and the migration rate included in γ, as well as the
reserve size m. Note that when m approaches zero, Eε approaches
1ε, and Eε has an asymptote for m¼ γ=ð1εÞ.4 This is illustrated
in Fig. 1 for ε¼0.20 for two values of γ – the asymptotes are equal
to 0.375 and 0.875, for γ equal to 0.30 and 0.70, respectively.
A large reserve can sustain a high fishing effort without jeopardizing
the targeted stock level ε.
The upward sloping Eε curves in Fig. 1 illustrate the tradeoffs
between effort and reserve size as possible management instru-
ments. However, when using the MPA approach, the economic and
catch efficiency characteristics of the HZ open-access fishery
determine the effort level. Thus fishing effort is an endogenous
variable also in the MPA case, as it is under pure open access. This
implies further that the restoration of a depleted stock becomes
easier with a reserve than without.
Bioeconomic models of fisheries largely focus on single stock
management, though some attention is being paid to multispecies
[24–27] and ecosystem [20] interactions. Nonetheless, scant atten-
tion has been afforded how fishing may affect the habitats that the
fish live in, and how this again may affect the stocks that the
fisheries depend upon [28]. Studies have shown that for instance
trawling on some ocean habitats may lead to poorer condition in
individual fish, and lower weight at age, which again reduces the
total biomass of the stocks [29]. The reasoning behind this effect
is that fishing activity affects prey availability through changes in
the substrate. In the remaining part of this section is assumed
that fishing has negative consequences on fish growth and that
implementing an MPA could potentially restore the habitat and
increase the fish stock growth towards former levels. In this case
Table 1
Parameter values used.





Fig. 1. The critical effort for precautionary stock level, Eε, is a fraction of reserve
size, m, and relative migration, γ. It has an asymptote which value also depends on
γ, equal to γ/(1ε).
3 Recall that the pre-MPA open access equilibrium stock level is c¼a/pr.
4 For γ 41 – ε there is of course no asymptote because of the limit m¼1. In
this case there is an upper limit to the effort level, found by substituting m¼1 in
(7).
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the intrinsic growth rate in the MPA becomes a function of the
reserve size; ~rðmÞ, with ~r 'ðmÞ40.
The intuition behind the reserve size based growth rate is that
an ecosystem supplies a number of different functions which are
spatially distributed, for instance spawning and nursery grounds,
juvenile and feeding areas, as well as hiding places. The larger the
un-fished areas, the more of these functions become protected,
and the more they supply growth related services that increase the
intrinsic growth. Thus, before fishing starts on a virgin stock, the
intrinsic growth rate is at its high virgin level r. When fishing is
introduced, habitat deteriorates, reducing the intrinsic growth rate
to r(0). The implementation of an MPA allows habitat to recover
and thus the intrinsic growth rate of this part of the stock's
distribution area increases towards its virgin maximum. The fact
that effort does not affect the intrinsic growth rate directly – r
(0) being a parameter – can be explained at least in two ways [30].
First, even though the same areas and habitats repeatedly are
fished upon, the destructive habitat effects may occur upon the
first fishing contact. Increased effort in the same area does there-
fore not decrease habitat any further. Second, r(0) is the reduced
intrinsic growth rate when the open-access fishery has reached its
bioeconomic equilibrium. In this case the habitat may only be
reduced further if economic and technical parameters change.
The habitat destruction with change from r to r(0), and the
restoration capacity of an MPA, give us a new Eq. (2) with ~rðmÞ and
~γ ðmÞ, while Eq. (3) remains unchanged,
~γ ðmÞ ¼ s
~rðmÞ4γ:
Applying this gives a new precautionary effort level:
~Eε ¼ 1εþ
mð1εÞþðγ ~γ ðmÞÞ
~γ ðmÞ=mð1εÞ1 : ð7aÞ
when there is a negative habitat effect of fishing, the precau-
tionary effort curves in Fig. 1 shift to the right, though still
emanating at ~Eε¼1ε, since ~Eε is now smaller than Eε and with
an asymptote at m¼ ~γ ðmÞ=ð1εÞ, which also shifts to the right.
From this, comparing (7a) to (7), it can be seen that the habitat
effect of fishing implies that the upper limit to effort, to assure a
precautionary stock level, is reduced for any MPA size, i.e. due to
the habitat effect, the stock can sustain a lower effort level before
it is reduced to it's critical level ε, but this effort level increases
with the MPA size, as for the curves in Fig. 1.
3.2. Food security and sustainable yield
One of the possible objectives of fisheries management, though
usually not favored by economists, is maximizing sustainable yield
in order to secure enough protein for people. In a single species
context this implies securing maximum sustainable yield (MSY).
Can this be achieved with an MPA in combination with an outside
open-access harvest zone? For given parameter values the answer
is yes in the case post-MPA growth equals pre-MPA growth as
described in Eqs. (3) and (4).5 This is illustrated in Fig. 2 where
each of the two curves show for a given value of γ the combined
reserve size, vertically, and the pre-MPA open-access stock level c,
horizontally, necessary to achieve MSY.
Note some characteristics of the two curves in Fig. 2. First, only
in the case that the resource is biologically overused from open-
access harvesting, co0.50, will the establishment of a permanent
MPA succeed in realizing MSY. Both curves emanate at c¼0.50 on
the horizontal axis, i.e. at the MSY stock level. Second, only the
curve for γ¼0.30 intersects the vertical axis, implying that the MPA
restricted open-access fishery can realize MSY even for very low
levels of c, provided the MPA size is close to 0.60. Third, in the case
of a higher γ, γ¼0.70 in Fig. 2, no MPA size is large enough to realize
MSY if c is low, cocmin. If the stock has been fished down below
cmin, in Fig. 2 equal to 0.15, a reserve will contribute to increased
total stock and to increased harvest, but not enough to realize MSY.
This is due to the relative migration rate γ, indicating that the
migration of fish from the reserve to the harvest zone is too fast
compared to the intrinsic growth needed to build up the stock to
the MSY level (recall γ ¼s=r). In fact it can be shown that this
occurs when γ40.50 since the intersection of the possibility curves
with the vertical axis is atmn¼2γ in Fig. 2 [15]. Fourth, an MPA may
contribute to achieve MSY even if γ is higher than 0.50 as long as
cminococmsy, i.e. when on the curve connecting cmin at m¼1 and
c¼0.50 at m¼0. To summarize, Fig. 2 demonstrates how MPA size
must be chosen to realize MSY for different combinations of
migration, intrinsic growth and pre-reserve stock size – the latter
determined by harvest efficiency, price of fish and cost of effort.
3.3. Employment
For those who espouse a welfare approach to fisheries manage-
ment, fisheries are seen as important labor market buffers in for
instance poor countries, while for those taking the wealth
approach, effort needs to be restricted in order for resource rent
to be generated. Independent of approach taken, to know how
effort and catch change when an MPA is implemented, is impor-
tant. In fisheries, employment is both output and input related;
total employment in the sector depends both on effort used in
capture and on catch landed for processing, which may be more
or less labor intensive. In the previous section the possibility of
designing an MPA to maximize harvest was discussed and it is
Fig. 2. Reserve size m* that can realize maximum sustainable yield (MSY) depends
on the pre-MPA open access stock level, c. For γo1/2 there exists a reserve size for
all co1/2 that can realize MSY in the outside open access fishery. If the relative
migration rate, γ, is somewhat higher (γo1/2) a reserve can not realize MSY for low
levels of c (cmin¼(1/2)(γ/4)).
5 For the proof see [15].
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likely that post-harvest employment in processing and distribu-
tion of fish increases with harvest. This section follows up on effort
and harvest related employment by analyzing how equilibrium
effort will change as a consequence of the introduction of an MPA.
Effort change also means change in employment needed for the
operation and maintenance of effort. Fishing effort is a composite
concept, designed for use in bioeconomic models where it bridges
the gap between humans' fishing activities and nature's fish stocks
through fishing mortality. In actual fisheries the composition of
effort varies, but with capital and labor as core inputs, in addition
to other variables such as fuel, gear, bait and ice. Empirical studies
have demonstrated that labor increases with effort, proportionally
or at a decreasing rate (see e.g. [31–33]). In the following, by
assumption, there are only quantitative changes in effort, no
qualitative changes in the input mix per unit of effort.
With logistic growth such as in (1), MSY can be achieved if
S¼1/2. Equilibrium effort will then be Emsy¼1/2 and harvest
Y¼r=4¼MSY, recalling the Schaefer harvest function Y¼rEmsyS
with E scaled such that the catchability coefficient equals r. To find
the effort needed to secureMSYwhen there is an MPA, equateMSY
to rEmsympaS2 and solve for E
msy
mpa. This yields E
msy
mpa ¼ 1=ð4cð1mnðcÞÞÞ
and implies that EmsympaEmsy40 for co1/2 and that the difference
increases with decreasing values of c and increasing values of m,
since mn is monotonically decreasing in c (see Fig. 2). Recall that
co1/2 is a requirement for being able to generate MSY through
the use of an MPA and open access in the HZ. Also recall that the
values of c (below 1/2) and γ jointly determine whether MSY is
achievable or not, and, given achievability, the size of the required
reserve (m). To summarize, for certain combinations of γ and c,
discussed above, an MPA and open access harvesting in HZ may
realize MSY through increased effort, thus increasing employment
in both fish processing and harvesting.
For harvest levels other than MSY it is necessary to limit the
analysis to numerical simulations. Fig. 3 shows equilibrium har-
vest as a function of effort in the no MPA case and in the case of a
reserve, when m¼0.25, for two different values of γ.
As can be seen from Fig. 3, the equilibrium yield curves are
skewed to the right in the case of an MPA, and the higher the value
of γ, the more to the right the curve will be situated. The point
where yield is zero for E40 corresponds to Eε with ε¼0 (Eq. (7a)).
It is also seen that to obtain a given yield, higher effort is required
in the case of an MPA than in the pure open access case. The
reason for the skewing to the right as a consequence of an MPA
may be that when effort is low, there is not really a need for an
MPA to protect the stock and the MPA is just a restriction without
benefits. As effort becomes higher the protective benefits of the
MPA ensures that total stock level is higher than in the pure open
access case, and the migration results in spillover that secures a
higher yield.
Fig. 4 displays open access equilibrium effort as a function of
reserve size m.
With respect to employment, it is concluded below that for the
cases when the MPA can realize MSY, both fishing and post-harvest
employment increases with MPA size up to the MSY reserve size.
Panel A in Fig. 4 shows how effort changes with m in the case of a
heavily overfished stock (c¼0.15) and panel B for a slightly
overfished stock (c¼0.45). At m¼0 effort is equal to the pure open
access case, E¼1c. It can be seen that the value of c determines
the maximum of E, in fact this is the maximum sustainable yield
effort Emsympa¼1/4c, whereas the value of γ influences the location of
the maximum. The reason for this is that the speed at which the
fish migrate influences the stock size within the MPA, and for slow
moving fish there will be a sufficiently large stock within the MPA
to provide high spillover levels at low MPA sizes. As the MPA
increases in size, the low speed of migration ensures that more of
the fish is retained within the reserve, thereby reducing the spil-
lover effect. For species with a high γ, the stock build-up within the
reserve is too low to provide high levels of spillover when the MPA
is small. As the MPA increases, so does the stock level and the high
speed of migration ensures that large spillover effects are generated
even at large MPA sizes. With respect to employment, it has been
demonstrated that for the cases when the MPA can realize MSY,
both fishing and processing employment increase with MPA size up
to the MSY reserve. However, further increase will reduce both
effort and processing employment.
3.4. Consumer surplus
With constant price of harvest and cost of effort no resource rent,
consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS), are generated in








Y(E) Y(E ; = 0.7)
Y(E ; = 0.3)
γ
γ
Fig. 3. Equilibrium yield as a function of effort. Solid line represents the no MPA
case and broken lines the case of an MPA being 25% of the distribution area.
Fig. 4. Open access equilibrium effort as a function of reserve size when c¼0.15 (A) and when c¼0.45 (B). Solid and broken lines represent cases where γ¼0.7 and γ¼0.3,
respectively. Note the differences in the vertical placing of the horizontal axes and the scales along the vertical axes.
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the analyses above. Then, from an economic point of view, why
bother with establishing MPAs if no economic rent is generated?
There are at least two answers to this. First, actual fishing fleets often
display heterogeneous vessels and costs – implying intra-marginal
rent in open-access fisheries [33] – to be discussed below. Second,
actual fish markets often display downward sloping demand and the
possibilities of CS. This will now be discussed. The increased harvest
following the creation of an MPA (see above) combined with a
downward sloping demand curve allows for the creation of CS.
Pezzey et al. [22] mention additionally, in the case of marine reserves,
the possibility of a shift in demand caused by “more desirable fish”
and in supply, caused by “more easily catchable fish”. Now, investi-
gate the case of consumer surplus to see how this changes the
previous conclusions about zero economic rent.
Fig. 5 shows the backward bending long-run open-access supply
curve as a function of the fish price, assuming all other parameters
being constant, [34] and [35].6 With a downward sloping demand
curve for harvest assume that there is a unique stable equilibrium at
overall open-access, with price of harvest po and harvest Y at O7
(Fig. 5). With an MPA the backward bending supply curve shifts to
the right and upwards. TheMSY supply (equal to 0.25) is the same for
all three curves. Demand and supply conditions in Fig. 5 have been
chosen such that HZ open-access is close to realizing MSY for MPA
size m¼0.75. In this case, the CS equals the triangle pmMp, which is
significantly greater than the pre-MPA CS triangle poOp. As demon-
strated above, tuning reserve size to realize MSY, under HZ open-
access, may or may not be possible, depending on biological and
economic parameters. The case of biological over-exploitation pre-
MPA and open-access harvesting in the HZ post-MPA implies
increased harvest as well as increased consumer surplus when
demand is downward sloping. This is clearly an economic benefit
to be expected from MPA creation for over-exploited resources.
Consumer surplus may be of great importance for some resources,
for example those harvested and used for easily perishable food at
limited size local or national markets.
3.5. Producer surplus
In the above analysis it has for simplicity been assumed that
vessels are homogenous. If vessels are heterogeneous, which is
usually thought to be a more realistic assumption, total cost of
fishing will be non-linear and the most efficient vessels will earn a
super-normal profit in spite of open access [21]. This rent is often
referred to as intra-marginal rent or producer surplus (PS), and a
recent example for an open-access developing country fishery is
demonstrated in [33]. Now the question is whether an MPA as the
only policy instrument can potentially increase PS.
Open access equilibrium effort is found where average rev-
enue AR(E) is equal to marginal cost MC(E). With no MPA and
total costs now assumed to be C¼αE2, equilibrium open access
effort and stock will be given by E1 ¼ pr=ðprþ2αÞ and
S1 ¼ 2α=ðprþ2αÞ. As noted above the reason for choosing the
well-known quadratic cost function is to let the MC increase in E
in a simple way. The alternative C¼αEa, with 1oao2 would
add another parameter, a, to the expressions of E1 and S1.
However, for empirical analysis this, and possibly also a constant
term in the C-function should a priory be included, as in [33].
With an MPA, open access stock level in the harvest zone
becomes S12 ¼ cð1mÞ, recalling that the pre-reserve open access
stock level is c. Fig. 4 shows four curves for E1 as a function of
reserve size m. Effort will increase with any reserve size if the
relative migration rate γ is large and the pre-reserve stock is
heavily overexploited (Fig. 4, panel A, solid line). In the other
three cases shown, effort increases with reserve size up to
between 0.2 and 0.5, then decreases. Actual reserves are rarely
greater than 20–50% of the total resource area. Note that for
panel A of Fig. 4 both curves represent a heavily overexploited
resource (down to 15% of the virgin stock level), and even for the
broken curve with moderate relative migration (γ¼0.3) effort
increases with reserve size up to about m¼0.5. The PS will
increase when effort increases. The value of the parameter α of
the total cost curve is by assumption adjusted such that effort at
the pre-MPA open access equilibrium is the same as in the linear
cost case, hence Fig. 4 can be used to find when an MPA will
increase PS. MPA sizes which result in an equilibrium effort level
higher than E1 (the intercept), will also increase PS. Therefore it
is seen that in the case of a heavily overfished stock (panel A) an
MPA of almost any size will cause equilibrium effort, and hence
also PS, to increase. In the case of a moderately overfished stock
(panel B), it is seen that an MPA of the correct size can result only
in small increases in effort, hence also only a small increase in PS,
whereas too large a reserve may cause effort and PS to decrease
compared to the pure open access case. Values for α are listed in
Table 1.
4. Discussion
It is a well-known result in resource economics that no rent is
generated under open access within the Gordon–Schaefer model
with constant price of fish and homogenous effort. However, it is
also known that small changes in the underlying assumptions may
allow for rent generation, in particular consumer and producer
surplus. This paper has discussed the possibility of such rent
generation by use of an MPA with open access fishing outside.
Maximizing total economic rent may of course not be the only
objective for fisheries management. Therefore, within this MPA
approach it is also discussed what would usually be classified as
ecological objectives, namely resource conservation and restora-
tion and maximum sustainable yield, as well as social objectives,
such as employment and food security.
Fig. 5. Backward bending open-access supply curves and consumer surplus (CS).
The triangle poOp is the CS for overall open-access and the triangle pMMp is the CS
for a nature reserve tuned to give nearly MSY, when allowing open-access in the
harvest zone.
6 In the MPA case S is based on HZ open-access harvesting, which implies
S2¼(1m)a/pr¼(1m)c. Substituting for this S2 into (4) gives in equilibrium
Y ¼ rðS1þð1mÞcÞð1ðS1þð1mÞcÞÞ
where S1 is implicitly given by (2). Thus Y is now implicitly a function of reserve,
biological and economic parameters, including price of harvest, and is shown as the
S dotted and broken curves in Fig. 3.
7 For a discussion of multiple equilibria, see [36].
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For developing countries, which typically have fisheries in
tropical ecosystems characterized by a high number of species
and mixed fisheries, limited resources available for fisheries man-
agement and a high degree of subsistence and small scale fisheries,
the management tools often used by industrialized countries are
not suitable. Taxing or controlling the harvest of thousands of
vessels, each catching a small amount which is sold on local
markets would be very demanding. Fisheries management does
not come for free and monitoring, control and enforcement are not
perfect, usually resulting in some IUU fishing [37]. For actual
management the efficiency and costs of different instruments
should be an integral part of the policy discussion. OECD fishing
countries had, in the period 1987–2007, on average a decline in fish
catches of about two percent per year, whereas the other fishing
nations worldwide had an annual increase of about two percent,
despite the more advanced instruments of the former [38]. Due to
overfishing and decline in catches in several member countries the
OECD has instigated discussions and analyses to mitigate such
problems [39,40]. Controlling that no one fish in a particular area
(MPA) might be easier and cheaper than conventional input and
output control, but it is essential to know how closing of an area
will affect stocks, harvest, vessels and labor, and if there could be
any economic and social benefits generated by doing so.
5. Concluding remarks
The introduction described briefly the current debate regarding
the appropriate approach to fisheries management in developing
countries. Those fronting the so-called welfare approach argue
that open access fisheries have a value as a source of food for poor
people and as a labor market buffer, while those defending the
wealth approach claim that effort has to be reduced in order for
rent to be generated.
This paper has shown that for heavily overfished stocks an MPA
may be used to protect stocks and their habitats, to maximize
harvest and to increase consumer and producer surplus. It may also
cause the number of people employed in the fishery to increase,
both as a consequence of increased effort and an increase in landed
quantity for processing and distribution. For moderately overfished
stocks the benefits are not as apparent. These findings suggest that
applying MPAs as management instruments may be suitable when
taking the welfare approach to fisheries management, but not when
taking the wealth approach. It is however not unlikely that even if a
country initially may see the welfare approach as the most sensible,
a transformation towards a wealth-based management system may
be desirable in the long run as the general economy improves and
good institutions and systems for redistribution of wealth are
developed. In this case the use of MPAs may slow the process
simply because more people may be involved in the fishery than
would otherwise be the case if it was left in a pure open access
state. However, as demonstrated in this paper, when there are other
management objectives than resource rent maximization, MPAs
have a role to play to enhance resources and marine ecosystem
services and to improve economic and social welfare.
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